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This paper examines the consequences of alternative CO2 emission reduction strategies on economic 
development and, in particular, the implications for the poor by empirically implementing an 
economy-wide model for India over a 35-year time horizon. A multi-sectoral, inter-temporal model in 
the activity analysis framework is used for this purpose. The model with specific technological 
alternatives, endogenous income distribution, truly dynamic behaviour and covering the whole 
economy is an integrated top-down bottom-up model. The results show that CO2 emission reduction 
imposes costs in terms of lower GDP and higher poverty. Cumulative emission reduction targets are, 
however, preferable to annual reduction targets and that a dynamically optimum strategy can help 
reduce the burden of emission reductions. The scenarios involving compensation for the loss in 
welfare are not very encouraging as they require large capital inflows. Contrasted with these, 
scenarios involving tradable emission quota give India an incentive to be carbon efficient. It becomes 
a net seller for the first 25 years and because of reduction in carbon intensity it would demand less in 
later years when it becomes a net buyer. The results suggest that for India, and other developing 
countries, the window of opportunity to sell carbon quotas is the next two decades or so. 
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1. Introduction 
  The contribution of the developing countries to the climate change problem has been historically 
small and their per capita emission of CO2
 is significantly lower than those in the developed world 
(Parikh et al., 1991). Yet, some of these developing countries are expected to significantly increase 
their emissions in the next couple of decades (WRI, 1996). China and India account for 21% and 16% 
of the current world population respectively and will need special attention in the future for the 
success of any global CO2 emission reduction strategy. The developed countries might also find CO2 
abatement in the developing countries to be less costly compared to their own domestic costs of 
mitigation. The developed countries may be seen by the developing countries as a source of financial 
and technological resources to help them control CO2 emissions without detracting from their 
developmental objectives. This paper examines the impact of CO2 emissions constraints on economic 
development and, in particular, the implications for the poor by empirically implementing an 
economy wide model for India. 
  Models that assess economic impact of climate change in the literature can be classified as 
bottom-up, top-down and integrated. The bottom-up models bring technological knowledge and 
specificity. However, often techno-economic evaluations are incomplete and overtly optimistic in that 
policy and institutional obstacles are not fully accounted for. Top-down models bring macro-
consistency. Among them are econometric models which use reduced form equations and the implied 
policies behind them remain unclear.  Another approach of top-down modeling is the computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) approach where a sequence of single period equilibria is worked out. In 
econometric and CGE models often a high substitution elasticity is assumed which makes it easy and 
relatively costless to adjust to CO2 constraints. The problem is thus assumed away. An activity 
                                                 
∗ This paper was completed a couple of years ago, but is being brought out as a working paper in August 2006. We are 
grateful to Jerzy A. Filar and Jyoti Parikh for their comments on an earlier draft. 
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analysis approach permits macro-consistency, dynamic behaviour, new and specific technological 
options and thus limited substitution. It can constitute a truely integrated top down-bottom up 
approach.  
  Energy sectors have been the focus of attention of several studies concerned with CO2 emissions. 
Manne and Richels (1992) is an example of this type of models built at a global level. Nordhaus 
(1994) synthesizes a climate feedback sub-model and a world economic sub-model to determine the 
optimal path of economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions over a long period of time. These 
global models tend to aggregate the economic activity in the world into a single sector. McKibben and 
Wilcoxen (1995) describe a global model in which money and financial constraints are incorporated. 
Cline (1992) and Fankhauser (1995) review various models of interactions between carbon dioxide 
emissions and the economy. Among global models the second generation model (SGM) of Edmonds 
et al (1992) is a general equilibrium multi-regional model used to calculate a sequence of equilibria.  
At the national level, computable general equilibrium models, which incorporate behaviour of 
individual agents in response to endogenous prices, have been used for development policy analysis 
(Adelman & Robinson, 1978, Dervis et al., 1982, Narayana et al., 1991).  These are either static 
models (Bergman, 1990) or dynamic ones (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990), useful for analyzing the 
effects of adopting alternative market-based policy instruments. The dynamic models typically lack 
sufficient inter-temporal choices; they obtain a sequence of single-period solutions with exogenously 
controlled state variables over time (Glomsrod, 1992). Shukla (1995) provides a critical assessment of 
greenhouse gas models and abatement costs for developing nations. 
  A few modeling studies have explored India's options. Blitzer et al. (1992a,b) use a multi-sectoral 
inter-temporal activity analysis framework and examine  the impacts of restrictions on emissions of 
CO2 and other greenhouse gases on economic growth of Egypt and India. They also examine the cost-
effectiveness of different measures for improving energy efficiency in reducing CO2 emissions. Their 
analysis of the trade-off between economic and environmental performances focuses on aggregate 
welfare measures like the GDP or the total consumption of the society as a whole. Shukla (1996) uses 
two models, the bottom-up MARKAL (Bergel et al, 1987) which is an energy system model suitable 
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for techno-economic analysis given exogenously specified sectoral growth rates and the top-down 
SGM with endogenous macro variables such as growth rate. The Indian component of SGM has been 
used to explore CO2 policy options for India (Shukla, 1996 and Fisher-Vander et al, 1997).  Gupta and 
Hall (1996, 1997) have tried to use a simple econometric macro-model as a top-down model to 
integrate technological options identified by techno-economic assessment of various technical options 
for carbon abatement.   
  In this paper, we have used the traditional activity analysis framework to model the linkages 
between the national economy and environment. Our programming model is multi-sectoral and inter-
temporal and maximizes an objective function, which is the discounted sum of utilities from 
consumption. The dynamic framework permits examination of optimal inter-temporal choices. There 
are some specific features we wish to highlight in our model of the Indian economy, which distinguish 
our approach from other models of India. Compared to Blitzer et al. (1992b), our model has 
endogenous income distribution. We also trace welfare effects for the low-income groups. This is done 
by examining the incidence of absolute poverty in the population. Secondly, there are large 
differences in consumption patterns among different income classes in a developing country, which 
are represented in our model. In this context, we also specify several alternative consumption bundles 
for each income class from which the respective representative consumers can choose. Thus, we 
permit consumer purchases to be sensitive to the relative shadow prices of commodities in our 
programming model. Endogenous income distribution is important because it will have considerable 
impact on the structure of consumption demand in the economy, as population in a lower income class 
today will move to a higher income class in the future as income growth takes place. Finally, we 
impose terminal conditions on stock variables in our model. With the inclusion of natural resources 
among the stock variables, the terminal conditions can be interpreted as sustainability constraints 
since it takes care of the assets left for the future generation. Compared to SGM's India model, which 
calculates a sequence of equilibria over time, ours is a dynamic model where inter-temporal 
substitution possibilities are permitted in the optimization process. Compared to Gupta and Hall's 
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econometric model also, ours is dynamically optimal and we confine ourselves to specific technical 
options, which have few unexplored barriers.  
  The main question we address is: what would be the consequence for growth and poverty in India 
of different carbon emission reduction strategies? Specifically, we examine the likely loss in national 
income growth and increase in the incidence of poverty due to annual or cumulative restrictions on 
CO2 emissions. Next, we have attempted to estimate the incremental costs of abating CO2 emissions 
and quantify the additional inflows of foreign finances, which will compensate the welfare losses 
incurred for abatement. Finally, we report on our results from simulating a system of global trade in 
CO2 emissions quotas to look at the attractiveness of such schemes for India. 
  The organization of the paper is as follows. The framework of the multi-period activity analysis 
model is briefly described in section 2. Several sets of model results are dealt with in Section 3: the 
economy-wide impacts of imposing CO2 emission constraints, the magnitude of income transfers 
from abroad as a measure of compensation for the developing countries that undertake emissions 
reduction and some experiments with internationally tradable CO2 emission quotas. We conclude in 
section 4 and point out policy implications of our results. The equations are given in the Appendix. 
The database used to implement the model is also laid out in the Appendix in Tables A1-A3. 
2. Model Structure 
The model is an activity analysis, multi-sectoral inter-temporal dynamic optimization one.  
This permits exploration of alternative technologies and CO2 strategies from a long term 
dynamic perspective. With alternative activities representing different technologies, one can 
permit substitution of various kinds and incorporate non-linearities in such models. The 
model maximizes a social welfare function given as the present discounted value of utility 
streams corresponding to the per capita consumption of an average consumer, given the 
resources available to it and the various technological possibilities for using them. In 
principle, the time horizon of the model must extend to infinity. Empirical models, however, 
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work with a finite time horizon of length, say, T time periods only (taken to be 35 years in 
our case) as it is computationally very difficult to work with an infinite number of time 
periods. Instead, they account for the post-horizon periods in other ways such as by making 
simplifying assumptions for the post terminal period, as we do below.. 
  We represent the whole economy with seven commodities/goods, some of which can be 
produced in more than one way. In particular, electricity can be produced by coal, oil, gas 
(combined cycle gas turbine, CCGT) and others (hydro and nuclear). We focus on specific 
options on the power side as large part of India's CO2 emissions occur in this sector and 
policy options here need to be clearly understood. Industrial output can be produced by two 
alternative activities that use coal-boiler and oil-boiler. Technical progress and energy 
efficiency gains over time are prescribed exogenously. These remain the same across all 
scenarios.  
Income distribution is endogenous and depends on the total consumption, exogenously 
projected total population and specified Lorenz ratio. Thus population belonging to each consumption 
expenditure class is determined in the model.  The composition of aggregate consumption changes 
nonlinearly as the economy grows and people move from one income class to another. Fifteen 
alternative consumption bundles are provided for each class to represent approximately the 
indifference curve of the class. This permits substitution across commodities as relative prices change. 
The bottom class corresponds to those below the poverty line so that we also get an indication of the 
number of poor in each period.  
Ideally income distribution should be linked to production structure and techniques. 
Unfortunately, adequate data on income generated by activities and how they are distributed to 
different income classes are not available. However, empirically income distribution as reflected in 
consumption expenditure has remained very stable with slow and miniscule changes in the Lorenz 
ratio. National Sample Survey (NSS) data show that it varied with minor fluctuations between 0.3417 
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in 1956-57 and 0.3202 in 1992 [see, Panda (1999)]. Thus an assumption of a constant Lorenz ratio 
over a long period of time is justified for India. 
The constraints in the model include the following: 
(i)  Commodity balance to ensure that demand does not exceed availability; 
(ii)  Production requires fixed capital which once allocated to an activity can not be shifted. Capacity 
constraints ensure that production does not exceed capacity created by investment in each 
activity; 
(iii)  Capital accumulation constraints that restrict capital stock in each activity to increase by net 
investment in each activity; 
(iv)  Domestic production of oil is restricted to reflect the small oil reserves in India. 
On the trade side, we impose a balance of payment constraint. There is also a wedge between 
export price and import price to reflect international trade and transport margins. Some restrictions are 
imposed on exports and import growth rates by sectors to keep the model realistic. Thus, import of 
agriculture is restricted to reflect a self-sufficiency requirement for a large country, which is 
considered necessary for food security. We also restrict import of services as not all services can be 
imported. In the  absence of non-linear export demand functions,  export bounds are introduced to 
account for  fall in export price and profitability consequent to large exports by India. The values of 
the bounds are given in the Appendix Table A2.   
A savings constraint is imposed to restrict marginal savings rate to 30 percent. Programming 
models often give high investments and implied savings rate. Such rates are not realistic as 
governments in democratic developing poor countries are not able to force savings rate beyond a 
limit. Finally, though the model is run for a period of 35 years, the post-terminal future has to be taken 
care of. This is done by assuming that a stationary state would prevail in the future with the 
composition of output, consumption, investment etc. fixed and growing at a prescribed rate. This 
translates into a larger weight for the terminal year consumption in the objective function.   
The model is solved using GAMS programming tool developed by Brooke et al. (1988).  Income 
distribution is endogenous in the model. It depends on the total income generated, which in turn 
  8 
depends on the income distribution. We assume an initial income distribution, compute the optimal 
solution and the resulting income and distribution and iterate till they converge.  
Emissions Inventory  
CO2 is emitted when fossil fuels such as coal and oil are burnt in production and household activities. 
For a given fuel, the amount of emission is directly proportional to its quantity burnt. The CO2 
emission coefficient of a fuel depends upon its carbon content. We account for these emissions in two 
different ways: flows and stocks. The emissions from the production sectors are computed by 
considering the scalar product of the activity vector and the emission coefficient vector that indicates 
the amount of emissions per unit level of activity. The emission coefficient for an activity is derived 
by considering the fuel specific emission coefficient and the fuel input coefficient. Apart from the 
production activities, emissions are also caused by the private and public consumption of fuels like 
kerosene, LPG and motor gasoline. We account for these by considering emission coefficients 
attached to each consumption activity. 
  The cumulative emission of CO2 at the end of any period is computed by adding the emission 
flows during the current period to the cumulative emissions carried over from the previous period. 
CO2 emissions are known to accumulate and reside for long duration in the atmosphere leading to 
increase in CO2 concentrations. 
Carbon Reduction Options 
In the model CO2 emissions can be reduced in a number of ways. First, it can be reduced by reducing 
the levels of different activities. This has the direct effect of reducing income and consumption and 
hence a loss in the social welfare. The second method is to change the composition of production in 
the economy in favour of less CO2-intensive activities. This can be done either by changing the 
structure of trade so that the more CO2-intensive products are imported or the structure of 
consumption and other final demand may be changed by reducing the budget share of CO2-intensive 
goods in total final demand. This leads to an indirect loss of current welfare as the investor and 
consumer choices get distorted. 
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  In addition, technological options are also available for reducing the CO2 intensity of activity 
levels. These have the virtue of reducing emissions without any significant loss of output. There are 
essentially two types of such options: (a) Reduce the amount of CO2 emitting energy inputs required 
by different activities; additional investment may be required to install equipment that can operate 
these processes at higher energy efficiency. (b) Switch to less carbon intensive fuels. For example, 
instead of a coal based power plant, we may install a CCGT power plant, or instead of running 
industrial boilers on coal, we may use oil.  The CO2 emission coefficient varies across the fuels, being 
highest for coal (26 tC/GJ), followed by oil (21 tC/GJ) and the lowest for natural gas (14.7 tC/GJ). 
Thus, oil or natural gas can substitute coal and lower CO2 emissions. 
  Alternative fuels or production technologies can be introduced by expanding the set of activities. 
None of the equations (given in Appendix) need change when new activities are introduced. 
3. Analysis of CO2 Emissions Reduction in India 
We use the model described in the earlier section to evaluate the impact on economic growth and 
other related variables of several alternative CO2 reduction targets over a period of 35 years from 
1990 to 2025.  The reference scenario is a ‘business-as-usual’ (BAU) scenario in which the pattern of 
growth of various variables is determined by the model in the absence of any emission constraints. 
We then develop scenarios in which there are restrictions on the amount of CO2 that can be emitted. 
These restrictions are applied in two different forms: (a) reduction of 10%, 20% and 30% in 
cumulative CO2 emissions (CEMT) over 35 years (these three scenarios are labeled C10, C20 and C30 
respectively); (b) annual reduction of 10%, 20% and 30% in CO2 emissions (EMt) in each year of the 
35-year time horizon (these three scenarios are labeled A10, A20 and A30 respectively). Thus, we 
have six different scenarios of emission restrictions for comparison with the BAU scenario. Next, we 
carry out a few compensation runs where loss in welfare due to emission restrictions is compensated 
through foreign income transfers. Lastly, we introduce a carbon quota regime with tradable permits 
and examine implications on India of such permits under alternative permit prices on the world 
market.   
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3.1 Data  
We have empirically implemented the model by using recent data for India to estimate the various 
parameters and initial values of different variables included in the model structure discussed in the 
previous section. Input-output coefficients and capital-output ratios for various activities form the core 
of the model. These data  are available from published sources for most sectors.
1 In some cases, like 
the capital-output ratios for the generation of electricity using alternative technologies, we have based 
our estimates on statistics published by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (1995) on the 
ongoing and proposed power projects in India. Future projections of government consumption levels 
and of the upper and lower bounds for exports and imports (where relevant) are specified in terms of 
growth rates. The database for operating the model is listed in Appendix Tables A1-A3.  
3.2 Impact of Carbon Dioxide Emission Restrictions 
Table 1 shows the values of some important macroeconomic variables and alternative activity levels 
for selected years for BAU scenario as well as various scenarios involving cumulative and annual 
emission reduction. Some characteristics of the BAU scenario may be noted. Under it, the economy 
grows at an average annual rate of 6.3% over 35 years. The carbon emissions grow from 157 mtc in 
1990 to 1421 mtc in 2025. Of these emissions, 61 mtc are from electricity generation and 53 mtc from 
industrial production in 1990 and 659 mtc and 397 mtc respectively in 2025. The annual emissions are 
plotted in Figure 1. The cumulative emissions over the 35-year period amount to 20353 mtc.    
  Enforcing a 10% (or even a 20%) cut on cumulative CO2 emissions has virtually no impact in the 
short run (3
rd or 5
th year) or medium run (10
th year); see column C10 or C20 of Table 1. The GDP and 
consumption levels fall only marginally. In the long run (30
th year), however, the effects of emission 
restriction are more visible. In the 30
th year under the C20 scenario, for example, GDP and 
consumption per capita fall by 1.36% and 1.85% respectively compared to the BAU scenario. As a 
result, number of people below the poverty line increases by 5.94%.  
                                                 
1 Details are available in Parikh et al. (1995) 
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  As the emission restriction level is tightened from 10% to 20% and further to 30%, the effects on 
long run GDP and welfare become increasingly adverse. Thus, GDP falls by 0.53%, 1.36% and 4.06% 
and the number of poor increases by 2.1%, 5.9% and 17.5%, in the 30
th year for 10%, 20% and 30% 
cumulative carbon emission restrictions respectively. The flexibility of the economic system gets 
reduced, as emission restriction becomes tighter. Also, note that the loss in GDP and consumption is 
nonlinear i.e., loss rises at an increasingly faster rate than emission restriction. For the case of a 30% 
restriction, even the short run effects (up to 5 years) are noticeable: GDP and per capita consumption 
loss is about 0.2% and incidence of poverty is higher by 0.3% compared to the BAU scenario. 
Furthermore, the losses are more severe towards the end of the target period (30
th year) than near the 
beginning of the restriction period. The model tries to postpone the economic losses due to two 
reasons: it discounts the future consumption flows and it also enjoys the facility of attaining emissions 
reduction target over a 35-year period rather than in just one or two years. 
  Next, we consider the impacts of imposing annual reduction targets for CO2 emissions. A 10% 
annual reduction target over each of the 35-year period (scenario A10) achieves the same reduction 
over the period as the 10% cumulative reduction scenario (C10). But the economic losses are larger 
under annual reduction scenario than cumulative reduction of the same order. For example, in the 
20% restriction case, annual constraints lead to a GDP fall of 3.66% in 30
th year as compared to 
1.36% for cumulative constraint and for 30% reduction, GDP is lower by a whopping 10.7%.  Annual 
constraints are more restrictive than cumulative constraints because they deprive the economic system 
of its freedom to choose an adjustment path over time, though the terminal period carbon stock level 
is the same under both types of constraints.  It can be seen in Figure 1 that under the C30 scenario, 
emission reductions are postponed towards the later part of the time horizon. 
  The short-run effects are also large for the case of annual constraints. GDP losses in 3
rd year vary 
from 0.47% in the case of 10% annual emission restriction to 11.86% for 30% restriction. The 
increase in number of poor is a large 20.67 percent increase even in the short run, and in the 30
th year 
the number of poor increase by nearly 50 percent for a 30% annual reduction, which indicates a 
significant short run burden on the lower income segment of the population. 
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  The model results for alternative activity levels for 5
th and 30
th years are also presented in Table 1. 
These results clearly illustrate that, when a CO2 emission constraint would be active, India would shift 
away from coal based electricity to oil and gas based electricity and from coal-boiler based 
manufacturing to oil-boiler based manufacturing. There is, however, no change over to a new 
technology in the short run when cumulative restriction of 20% or less is affected.   
These scenarios suggest the following : 
(a)  Cumulative emission reduction targets are preferable to annual reduction targets and that a 
dynamically optimum strategy can help reduce the burden of emission reductions.   
Methodologically it suggests that an inter-temporal optimizing framework as we have used, is 
needed for exploring CO2 reduction strategies.  One may note that sequential general equilibrium 
models, which have many desirable features should be driven by dynamically optimal scenarios 
generated by the type of model presented here. 
(b) Even cumulative reduction targets increase poverty by a larger percentage than it reduces GDP.  
The GDP loss is also not negligible in the long run. 
(c)  Annual emission reductions, which is implicit in the pressures put on developing countries by 
denying them finance and credit for coal based power plants, for example, imposes unnecessary 
costs in terms of reduced GDP and higher poverty, both in the short and the long run through 
distortions in choice of techniques in electricity generation as well as in energy use in industry. 
3.3 Compensation for Reduction of CO2 Emissions 
A developing country like India, which has so far contributed very little to the climate change 
problem, cannot afford a loss in GDP and an increase in poverty due to carbon emission restriction. 
India could justifiably seek financial assistance or other forms of compensation from the rest of the 
global community for reducing its domestic CO2 emissions for the sake of meeting global emissions 
reduction targets.
2 What would be the quantum of such compensation? Our model provides a 
                                                 
2 Technological assistance could be another form of compensation. 
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framework to compute the level of financial compensation that will offset the loss of social welfare 
associated with a given target of reducing domestic CO2 emissions.  
  We model the financial compensation in the form of additional foreign  capital inflows coming 
from a global fund
3. The exact procedure we follow is to let foreign transfers in each year become an 
endogenous variable while it was exogenously fixed earlier. The objective function is also modified: 
we minimize the discounted sum of foreign inflows subject to maintaining the consumption path and 
welfare level as in the BAU scenario. This ensures that the additional inflows of foreign capital are 
not larger than the minimum required. 
  These scenarios assume that whatever additional foreign capital inflowsocccur, they will be used 
appropriately.  In reality, such compensation is unlikely to be optimally used and welfare loss is 
bound to result.  Nonetheless, the scenarios provide an idea of the broad magnitude of the 
compensation needed. 
  The results of a numerical exercise to compute the compensation levels for two scenarios C30 and 
A30 are reported in Table 2. The capital flows are not needed in each year of the 35-year time horizon 
considered here. They would be needed only in some years when additional investments are 
undertaken in carbon saving technology. The required capital flows needed to compensate for welfare 
loss for the cumulative reduction case (C30Comp) amounts to Rs.1453 billion ($ 87 billion at the 
exchange rate of Rs.16.65 to a US$ prevalent in 1989-90) during the whole period. However, the very 
first year an inflow of US$ 41 billion is called for. Such large flows seem highly unlikely. Even if this 
were available, India’s capacity to absorb this fruitfully is very doubtful.  If, however, the inflows in a 
given year were restricted so as to spread them out over time, the total inflows would have to be 
larger. This is obvious as the economy would be additionally constrained. The scenario estimate of $ 
87 billion has to be recognized as a lower bound. The magnitude of such flows rises three-fold to $ 
278 billion for the case of annual emission reduction (A30Comp). The foreign capital flows are used 
to invest for shifting away from coal based production to oil and gas based production processes. In 
                                                 
3 The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is a leading example of such a fund though its finances are very 
limited at present. 
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particular, large scale oil-boiler is adopted for the manufacturing sector when capital flows 
accompany the emission restriction targets (compare activity levels in Table 2 with those in Table 1 
under the same column headings). Moreover, the capital flows required under annual reduction 
scenario is very large in the initial year (about 70% of GDP or $ 165 billion) and points to the 
infeasible nature of annual reduction strategy in practice. Lastly, it may be pointed out that terminal 
consumption level in these scenarios remains the same as in BAU scenario and so no costs are shifted 
to the post-terminal period even as CO2 constraints are being met within the 35-year period. 
  These scenarios show the compensation has to be large running into US$ 87 to US$ 278 billion if 
India were to be induced to reduce its CO2 emissions. Such compensations seem unlikely at present 
and thus, other mechanisms should be explored to induce India (and other developing countries) to 
reduce their CO2 emissions. Tradable emission quota is an obvious instrument. We now examine it. 
3.4 Tradable CO2 Emission Quotas 
A variety of market-based instruments to implement CO2 abatement objective like a carbon tax or a 
tradable emission quota are discussed in the literature. The quantitative implications of adopting such 
policies for the economic performance of the Indian economy is worth examining. In a global scheme 
of tradable emission quotas, each country is allotted a fixed annual emission quota. A country’s right 
of emission could, however, be augmented through purchase of quota right of another country which 
has generated a surplus by keeping its emission less than the quota. No country is permitted to emit in 
excess of the total quota held by it net of sales and purchases. This ensures that the global emissions 
never exceed the total quotas allotted to all the countries. In a system of tradable emission quotas, the 
efficiency and equity issues may be treated independent of each other. The opportunity to trade in 
quotas leads to efficient use of means of abatement, while the initial allocation rule could take into 
account equity and need of various countries. Bertram (1992) and Parikh and Parikh (1998) have 
argued among others the case for tradable permits as a global policy option for limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
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  We now describe a set of simulations performed with our model, which brings out the impact of 
emission quota trade on economic development in India. The revenue from the sale of surplus 
emission quota affects the economy in two ways:  
(a)  it relaxes the foreign exchange constraint and permits larger volume of imports, and 
(b) the increased foreign savings in the form of additional foreign exchange availability helps to 
expand domestic investment. 
  We stipulate a few simple rules of trade in emission quotas. If emissions in a country fall short of 
quota allotted for any particular year, then it has permission to sell the surplus quota in the same year 
at ruling world market prices. Similarly, its emissions may exceed the quota allotted for any particular 
year provided it bridges the deficit by purchasing them in the same year at going world market prices. 
We have not considered the scope for banking the quota unused in one year for use in another year. 
Nor do we permit lending and borrowings of foreign exchange from one year to the other.  Yet, this is 
a potentially better situation than an annual restriction on CO2 emissions (section 3.2) as some inter-
temporal adjustment is possible by trading in quotas. Permission to bank or borrow quotas or dollars 
from one year to another will be more beneficial just like cumulative restriction on emission 
compared to annual restriction. 
  It is beyond the scope of this paper to specify how the world market price (P
CQ) of carbon quota is 
determined.  One method could have been to use the price emerging from a global modelling system, 
which links policy models of different countries. Examples of such models are the Basic Linked 
System (BLS) of agricultural policy models by Fischer et. al (1988) and the SGM model by Edmonds 
et. al (1992). However, the prices generated in a scenario of such a global model will depend on the 
policy reactions of many countries. Moreover, the equilibrium quantity trajectory for India underlying 
the price trajectory in the global modelling system would not be consistent with the quantity trajectory 
generated using our model. Hence, we take a simple approach of specifying a constant real price of 
carbon quota for all the 35-year time period in a scenario, but we simulate over a set of alternative 
prices in different scenarios to map out the supply function of India’s net exports of carbon quotas.   
  16 
  The economy reacts to variations in this price by buying or selling emission quotas in different 
simulation runs. How should emission quotas be allocated? Parikh and Parikh (1998) have argued for 
equal per capita allocations, which are kept fixed to the population of the country on the day a global 
agreement is signed. This is to give an incentive to developed countries to sign the agreement quickly 
and not to give developing countries a perverse incentive to increase their population. They have also 
suggested that this should be on a cumulative basis covering emissions over some past and some 
future years.  Here, however, we make a simpler assumption.  The emission quota is fixed at 1 tonne 
of carbon (tc) per capita
4 based on 1990 population. This amounts to 821.9 million tc per year and 
remains at that level for the entire period
5. Table 3 shows the results for a world market price ranging 
between Rs. 100 to Rs.1000 at 1989-90 prices
6, i.e., US$ 6 to 60 per tonne. It might be noted that in 
the compensation scenarios, the implicit cost per tonne of carbon reduction was $ 15 in C30Comp and 
$ 42 in A30Comp.  Also, in these scenarios, India is assumed to be a small country in the world quota 
trade and so its sale or purchase does not affect the world market price. 
  Under the above quota system, it is usually the case that a developing country like India would 
have surplus emission quotas in the initial years because the size of its economy is small on a per 
capita basis during the initial years. As Table 3 shows the cumulative sale by India of surplus quota in 
the world market would be between about 10400 to 11400 mtc over the 35-year period, i.e. an average 
of about 297-325 mtc per year under different price scenarios. Over time, however, the economy 
grows and the surplus gets reduced. Indeed, India starts purchasing the quota of other countries 
sometime between the 24
th and 27
th year. The cumulative purchase of quota by India over the 24
th to 
35
th year turns out to be about 3200 to 4500 mtc, or an average of 91 to 129 mtc per year.  
  Tradable carbon quota is an asset held by the economy and an increase in its sale revenue permits 
domestic consumption and/or investment level to expand. Earnings from the sale of surplus quota may 
thus be viewed as similar to the financial compensation schemes discussed above. In the experiments 
                                                 
4 This is roughly equal to per capita world emission in 1990. 
5 It should be pointed out that, starting from 1 tC/capita in 1990, the emission quota decreases at a rate equal to 
the rate of growth of population (1.8% per year) and drops to only 0.53 tC/capita by the year 2025,  the 
terminal year in the model. 
6 The exchange rate of the Indian rupee was US$ 1= Rs. 16.65 in 1989-90. 
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carried out here, the economy grows over and above the base run (BAU) since the quota fetches 
additional revenue from rest of the world in the initial 24-27 years. The net present value (NPV) of 
per capita consumption stream, a measure of aggregate welfare, increases with quota price. With 
additional growth in the economy, cumulative carbon emissions rises over the BAU run by 400 to 
3300 mtc (an increase of 2 to 16%) depending on price of the quota (Table 3).  
  Does India sell more as quota price rises? India's offer curve for the price range considered here is 
drawn in Figure 2. It is not upward slopping at all ranges. The supply curve is backward bending in 
several ranges. The supply or surplus depends on the size of the domestic economy and the carbon 
intensity of the production processes. In order to understand the turning points in the curve, we 
document the activity levels in Table 4 in the electricity and the manufacturing sectors which have 
alternative production techniques in the model. Table 4 reveals that India finds it optimal to invest in 
new carbon saving production techniques with rise in world price of carbon quota. The production 
techniques of the BAU run continues till quota price reaches Rs. 150 (US$ 9) when it becomes 
economical to invest in combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) to produce electricity. The processes 
adopted at price of Rs. 150 again continues there after till world quota prices reaches Rs. 400 when 
there is a shift to hydro and nuclear options as indicated by the expansion of the 'other electricity' 
activity. The next jump in technology occurs at a price of Rs.700 with adoption of oil-boilers for 
industrial production.  
  It is interesting to note in Figure 2 that the supply curve for carbon quota turns upwards precisely 
as a shift occurs to a new technology at prices Rs. 150, 400 and 700. Clearly, it is optimal for India to 
invest in new technology and thereby generate surplus quota to increase the sale of the quota in the 
world market at these prices. However, when the production techniques remain unchanged, the 
economy does not find it optimal to expand sale of quota in the international market even at higher 
quota prices in some ranges. The supply curve thus bends backwards in the price range Rs. 150-350, 
450-650 and beyond Rs.700. It is optimal for India to reduce its offer of quota to rest of the world in 
these ranges and use the quota for expanding domestic production instead.  
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  We document in Table 5 some key variables for the 30
th year to examine long run effects. The 
quota runs show significant welfare gains for India. GDP in 30
th year increases by 6.7% over BAU for 
a quota price of Rs 100 ($ 6) per tc. It turns out to be significantly larger for higher quota prices and 
rises by about 60% for a quota price of Rs 1000 ($60). The number of poor declines substantially by 
20% or more compared to the BAU scenario. The total CO2 emission in the 30
th year goes up by 10 to 
20% over the BAU scenario because of the larger size of the economy. But, carbon intensity of the 
production process falls drastically by 6 to 25% for quota price of Rs. 200 ($12) and above, reflecting 
adoption of new technology. Thus, while a carbon quota system helps to raise GDP in a developing 
country like India, it also helps in reduction of carbon intensity in the production process. In the 
Indian case, as we have discussed above, this occurs through substitution of coal by oil and gas.  
We have carried out the numerical experiments of the model with relatively few alternative 
techniques. With increased revenue from sale of tradable quota, technical change could be further 
induced. One could then expect a more comprehensive new menu of options for CO2 mitigation to 
develop. Such an emerging scenario is likely to reduce even total emission from the BAU level even 
as GDP rises.  
4. Conclusions 
    Based on our analysis and the rationale we have presented, India should not have any 
obligation to reduce its carbon emissions for quite some time. Emission reduction imposes costs in 
terms of lower GDP and higher poverty. If India is to reduce emissions, it should be compensated for 
the loss. The compensation scenarios are not very encouraging as they require large capital inflows to 
ensure that welfare levels are maintained. 
  Can one interpret the compensation scenarios as scenarios of Kyoto protocol? In the 
compensation scenarios, India needs US$ 87 billion to US$ 280 billion of capital inflows to reduce its 
carbon emissions by 30 percent cumulatively for 35 years or every year for 35 years respectively and 
it still maintain its welfare level. Under the Kyoto protocol inflows may come from private firms 
setting up carbon reduction projects in India. Should India welcome this? Of course, the answer would 
depend upon what price India gets for emission reduction. The 30 per cent reduction scenarios reduce 
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emission by 6.1 billion tones of carbon over 35 years. In the annual reduction scenario to maintain 
welfare at the same level, a compensation of $278 billion is required. This means that the welfare cost 
of reducing emissions by 1 tc is about $45 for India. In the cumulative reduction scenario, the implicit 
welfare cost comes to $14 per tc. For simplicity, we have not discounted compensation and emission 
reductions. Thus, if any CDM project that gives India as its share less than $14 per TC, then India 
should not accept it. At $14 India just breaks even. It ought to get something more to make it worth its 
while. The fact that CDM projects bring investment may be looked at its own right as any other 
foreign direct investment project. Accept it if it makes sense by itself. One may also note that at $14 
per tc, India does not gain anything from it. The emission credits would be claimed by foreign 
investors, and if anything, India loses the low hanging fruits of carbon emission reduction, which may 
be more valuable when the time comes for it to curtail its emissions. 
Contrasted with these, the tradable quota scenarios give India an incentive to be carbon efficient. 
It becomes a net seller for the first 25 years and because of reduction in carbon intensity it would 
demand less in later years when it becomes a net buyer. In any case, a tradable quota regime would 
lead to much more induced technical change than what is provided in our scenarios. One can even 
expect a net reduction in India’s emissions in spite of higher growth. 
In the quota scenarios, India remains a net seller only for around 25 years.  This suggests that for 
India, and other developing countries, the windows of opportunity to sell carbon quotas is the next 
two decades or so.  If these are missed, it would be difficult to persuade them to join in a global effort 
to reduce carbon emissions. A global agreement without their willing participation would be that 
much more difficult.  
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                  Table 1: Scenarios for Carbon Emission Reduction by India 
BAU C10 C20 C30 A10 A20 A30
Gross Domestic Product (Rs. Billion)
Year 3 4850 -0.02 -0.02 -0.19 -0.47 -3.79 -11.86
Year 5 5301 -0.02 -0.02 -0.17 -0.47 -2.83 -10.45
Year 10 6801 -0.03 -0.03 -0.62 -0.59 -2.93 -9.07
Tear 20 12307 -0.02 -0.30 -1.45 -0.59 -3.30 -10.17
Year 30 24595 -0.53 -1.36 -4.06 -0.69 -3.66 -10.70
Per Capita Consumption (Rs.)
Year 3 3758 0.00 0.00 -0.21 -0.48 -4.18 -12.43
Year 5 3902 0.00 0.00 -0.21 -0.44 -3.13 -11.05
Year 10 4431 -0.02 -0.02 -0.74 -0.59 -3.14 -9.86
Tear 20 6520 -0.02 -0.41 -2.42 -0.71 -3.74 -11.86
Year 30 10888 -0.63 -1.85 -4.95 -0.81 -4.14 -12.03
Number of Poor (Million)
Year 3 298.80 0.03 0.03 0.34 0.77 6.58 20.67
Year 5 292.35 0.03 0.03 0.33 0.72 5.04 18.90
Year 10 258.83 0.04 0.04 1.34 1.04 5.70 19.02
Tear 20 139.58 0.08 0.99 5.95 1.65 9.42 33.22
Year 30 39.43 2.10 5.94 17.48 2.45 14.34 49.65
Cumulative Emissions (mtc) 20353 -10.00 -20.00 -30.00 -10.00 -20.00 -30.00
Selected Activity Levels in Year 5 
Electricity-coal 216 216 216 173 162 142 129
Elecctricity-others 41 41 41 41 52 64 58
Electricity-oil 16 16 16 16 16 10 0
Electricity-CCGT 0 0 0 37 37 42 47
Industry-coal 3962 3961 3961 3895 3734 2330 2074
Industry-oil 0 0 0 0 164 1454 1350
Selected Activity Levels in Year 30
Electricity-coal 1190 664 635 616 901 704 575
Elecctricity-others 10 269 289 280 36 197 251
Electricity-oil 4 4 4 0 4 4 4
Electricity-CCGT 0 229 227 224 230 221 202
Industry-coal 17526 17421 4879 1172 17362 16320 14317
Industry-oil 0 0 12689 16193 41 403 801
BAU: Business as usual
A10,A20,A30: Annual reduction of CO2 emission by 10%, 20%, 30% over BAU
C10,C20,C30: Cumulative reduction of CO2 emission by 10%, 20%, 30% over BAU
Percentage Change from BAU
Absolute Levels in Rs. Billion
 




Table 2: Compensation Through Additional Foreign Capital Flows 
   
  C30Comp A30Comp 
Additional Foreign Capital Flows (Rs. Billion*)   
Year 1  685 ($41) 2753 ($165) 
Year 3  0 319 ($ 19) 
Year 5  0 279 ($ 17) 
Year 10  0 0 
Tear 20  0 0 
Year 30  0 0 
Year35 768  ($46) 0 
Cumulative over 35 years  1453 ($87) 4634 ($278) 
Additional Foreign Capital Flows as % of GDP   
Year 1  15.4 69.7 
Year 3  0.0 6.9 
Year 5  0.0 5.4 
Year 10  0.0 0.0 
Tear 20  0.0 0.0 
Year 30  0.0 0.0 
Year35 2.2 0.0 
Cumulative over 35-years  0.29 0.94 
Selected Activity Levels in Year 5 (Rs. Billion)   
Electricity-coal 150 139 
Elecctricity-others 68 63 
Electricity-oil 0 0 
Electricity-CCGT 55 51 
  
Industry-coal boiler  2330 0 
Industry-oil boiler  18214 3690 
Selected Activity Levels in Year 30 (Rs. Billion)   
Electricity-coal 643 642 
Elecctricity-others 292 287 
Electricity-oil 0 4 
Electricity-CCGT 234 228 
  
Industry-coal boiler  629 629 
Industry-oil boiler  17541 17729 
Note: Compensation is through minimum additional foreign capital inflows 
that would maintain the consumption path of BAU scenario. 
* Figures in parentheses are in Billions of US$.   
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Table 3: Tradable Carbon Quota for India: 1990-2025 
      
Emission  Cumulative  Cumulative   Cumulative  Year   Cumulative   Increase  
Quota  sale of  purchase of  net sale of  by which   emission   in NPV 
Price  carbon   carbon   carbon   there is  rise over   of per 
  quota over  quota over  quota over   purchase Base Run  capita 
Rs/tC   35 years   35 years   35 years  of quota  (mtC)   cons  
  (mtC)  (mtC)  (mtC)      stream (%)  
          
100 11207  3203 8004 26 1231  4.5 
150 11711  2870 8841 26 394  6.8 
200 11435  3231 8204 26 1031  9.0 
300 10913  3930 6983 25 2251  13.2 
350 10690  4312 6378 24 2857  15.3 
400 10529  2992 7537 27 1698  17.3 
450 11127  3298 7829 25 1406  19.4 
500 11127  3611 7516 26 1719  21.5 
550 10931  3911 7021 24 2214  23.5 
600 10758  4201 6557 25 2678  25.4 
650 10570  4481 6089 24 3146  27.3 
700 10489  3925 6564 25 2671  29.2 
800 10429  3907 6522 25 2713  32.9 
900 10473  4139 6334 25 2901  36.6 
1000 10457  4546 5912 24 3323  40.3 
Notes: (i)Carbon quota of 822 mtc  per year (1 tc/capita in 1990).     
          (ii) Rs. 100 was equivalent to US$ 6 in 1989-90, the base price for the model. 
          (iii) NPV is net present value at a discount rate of 10%.     
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Table 4: Activity Levels for Different Carbon Quota Prices in Year 30
(Rs. Billion)
Quota Price
(Rs./tc) coal others oil CCGT coal boiler oil boiler
BAU 1190 10 4 0 17526 0
100 1282 10 4 0 19065 0
150 1043 10 4 259 19899 0
200 1078 10 4 268 20656 0
300 1142 10 4 284 22042 0
350 1175 10 4 312 24186 0
400 828 377 4 297 23320 0
450 853 387 4 306 24082 0
500 875 399 4 314 24801 0
550 896 407 4 322 25464 0
600 917 417 4 329 26104 0
650 935 425 4 336 26637 0
700 956 435 4 344 11420 16385
800 995 452 4 358 4269 250468
900 1036 471 4 373 1736 28968
1000 1073 488 4 386 680 31225
Electricity Industry
  27 
Scenario GDP Number  of  Carbon Carbon 
Poor Emission Emission GDP Number Carbon
/ GDP of Poor /GDP
(Rs Billion) (Million) (Mtc) (tc/Rs million) ratio
BAU 24595 0 1025 0.042
QP100 26249 0 1106 0.042 6.7 -21.7 1.1
QP200 27916 0 1090 0.039 13.5 -38.1 -6.3
QP300 29404 0 1156 0.039 19.6 -49.7 -5.7
QP400 30807 0 1066 0.035 25.3 -58.0 -17.0
QP500 32397 0 1128 0.035 31.7 -66.1 -16.5
QP600 33795 0 1184 0.035 37.4 -71.7 -15.9
QP700 35126 0 1141 0.032 42.8 -75.5 -22.1
QP800 36440 0 1145 0.031 48.2 -79.0 -24.6
QP900 37789 0 1175 0.031 53.6 -82.2 -25.4
QP1000 39173 0 1213 0.031 59.3 -85.0 -25.7
Note: QP100 indicates carbon quota run with price Rs.100 and so on.
PercentageChange over BAU
Table 5: Selected Variables for Year 30 Under Different Scenarios
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Appendix 1: Model Equations 
The model's objective is to maximize a social welfare function W given as the present discounted 
value of utility streams {Ut} corresponding to the per capita consumption (PCt) of an average 
consumer over the time horizon 1,2,....,T. The social discount rate chosen is ρ. 












1 ρ  where  UP C tt = log( ) and  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =   (1) 
The logarithmic form of the utility function reflects the basic law of ‘diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption’ and provides a higher weight to the consumption of a poorer person. We consider n 
commodities and m activities. For empirical implementation of the model, n = 7, m = 11 and T = 35. 
The above maximization is subject to several constraints. The first constraint refers to material 
balance. The total supply of each commodity i, domestic production  (Y) plus imports (M), must be no 
less than the total demand which is the sum of intermediate demand, private consumption (H), public 
consumption (G), investment (N) and exports (E). All these are real variables evaluated at the base 
year's prices. 
Y  M  a  X  H  g G  N  E  i t  i t  i  j 
j
m







where i = 1,2,…,n and t = 1,2,…,T    (2) 
where [aij] is the input-output matrix with i commodities and m activities, X is a vector of activity 
levels and {g} is the vector of public consumption budget shares. Gt is specified exogenously while 
determination of Hi,t in relation to the per capita consumption (PCt) is discussed below later. The 
input-output matrix need not be square as we distinguish between the set of commodities and the set 
of activities that produce them. In general, more than one activity is capable of producing a given 
commodity. A 'make' matrix [uij], as is commonly called by economists in the input-output literature, 
links each production activity to the commodities they produce. When premultiplied to the vector of 
activity levels it gives the vector of commodity outputs. Additionally, this allows the possibility of 
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joint production: an activity may produce more than one output. There is one column vector 
corresponding to each activity in this matrix and it represents numerically the commodity-wise 
composition of its gross output. 
 
Y  i t  i  j 
j 
m 




    where i = 1,2,…,n and t = 1,2,…,T      (3) 
The income generated by each production activity is proportional to its respective level (X) and is 
equal to the value of the output less the cost of the inputs. Aggregation over all activities (j) gives the 
gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices. 
 
GDP  u  a  X t  i j  i j i 
n 
j t j 
m
=  −  ∑  ∑ 
=  =
(  )   1  1 
  where t = 1,2,…,T        (4) 
The constraints in equations 5 to 9 describe the capacity and investment relations in the economy. All 
activities must operate within the available domestic capacity. 
 b  X  K  j  j t  j t   ≤      where j = 1,2,…,m and t = 1,2,…,T        (5) 
where Kj,t is the capital stock available for activity j in period t and bj is the incremental capital output 
ratio (ICOR) for activity j. The production capacities available in different sectors at the beginning of 
the first period are specified as a part of the initial conditions, 
 {  }  {  }  K K    j1 =    where  m j ,..., 2 , 1 =       (6) 
j1
We have computed {K −
1} using equation 5 as an equality for t=1, assuming that there was full capacity 
utilization in that year. Capital stock for the later periods is accumulated through investment (Z) 
which mature into new capacity after a lag of one period. 
 K  d  K Z  j t  j  j t  j t  (  )  ≤  −  +  −  −  1  1  1   where j = 1,2,…,m and t = 1,2,…,T  (7) 
where dj is the rate of depreciation of capital stock in sector j. 
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  The aggregate level of investment is constrained by the total savings generated in the economy. 
The model chooses consumption and savings levels for each period by optimizing the inter-temporal 
preferences. To counter the possibility of high savings rates resulting in unrealistically low 
consumption levels we impose an upper limit on the aggregate investment by specifying a marginal 
savings rate (s). 
 
Z S  s GDP GDP F j t  t
j 
m 




 where    T t ,.., 2 , 1 =    (8) 
where Ft is the exogenously specified level of foreign capital inflows in period t. 
  The investment (Z) by sector of destination such as agriculture or electricity must be balanced 
against the investment goods available by sector of origin (N) such as machinery or construction. 
Therefore, we have 
 
k  Z  N  i  j  j t 
j 
m 
i t      
= 
∑  ≤ 
1    where i = 1,2,…,n and t = 1,2,…,T         (9) 
where kij is capital coefficient indicating amount of i-th type of capital per unit investment in sector j.  
  Turning now to trade, we impose the constraint the total value of imports cannot exceed the 
foreign exchange available either through export earnings or through inflows of foreign capital (Ft). 
 
M  E  F  i t  i 
n 
i t  i 
n 
t     ≤  ∑  ∑  + 
=  =  1 1  where  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =      (10) 
The export markets are not unlimited for India and an upper bound on the growth rate of exports is 
1 ( 1 it it E E + ≤ −
more realistic.  
EU
i g  where i = 1,2,…,n and t = 1,2,…,T      ( 1 1 )   )
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where g
EU is upper bound on the growth of exports. Similarly, import upper bounds are also used for a 




i it M g M ≥ + − ) 1 ( 1     where i = 1,2,…,n and t = 1,2,…,T  (12) 
where g
MU is the upper bound on the growth of imports.  
  While we might restrict our choices to T periods in practice, the economy would continue to 




+ T K  to provide for the future. 
{} { KK } T T + + ≥ 1 1       (13) 
However, what is {K −
T+1}? We assume that output, capital stock and consumption grow at a constant 
rate (φ) in the post-terminal period (T+1,…,∞), i.e., the economy attains a stationary, but not static  
state. 
 {Y       for      t  >  T t  t Y }  ( ){ } = + − 1 1 φ      (14) 
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1  φ  φ       or             where i = 1,2,…,n and t = 1,2,…,T  (15) 
The above simplification might compromise the optimality of the solution determined by us. 
However, a compromise is unavoidable in this case. 
  The objective function is now modified to include the utility from post-terminal consumption, 
which is assumed to grow at the post terminal rate of φ. The revised objective function can be 
expressed as 
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=   (16) 
Where  ' φ  is per capita consumption growth. The derivation is shown in appendix 2. This gives a 
higher weight (typically, α > 1) to the utility derived from consumption in the terminal period because 
the post-terminal consumption is directly proportional to it. This is in contrast to the objective 
function defined earlier in equation 1, in which the weight attached to utility is the least in the 
terminal period. Were the objective function not modified in the above fashion, the model would 
choose a smaller consumption level for the terminal period as this leads to a smaller requirement of 
capital investment for post-terminal growth. 
  The basic framework discussed above completes the description of the likely growth pattern of an 
economy. Only one thing remains to be specified: how is Hi,t, the consumption expenditure by sectors 
determined in relation to PCt?  We turn to this now.  
Consumption Expenditure Distribution and Poverty  
Developing countries typically articulate two concerns other than aggregate economic growth: 
reduction of mass poverty and provision of minimum basic needs to their people. We incorporate 
aspects related to absolute poverty in our model by focussing on the distribution of consumption 
expenditure amongst the population.
7 We segment the total population into three different classes by 
arranging the population in ascending order of per capita consumption expenditure. A fixed pair of 
lower and upper boundaries   defines the class p. The lowest income households are 
included under the class p = 1, their per capita consumption being less than   which is made equal to 
the poverty line so that households belonging to this class are identified as poor.   
) , (
1 p p l l
−
1 l
                                                 
7 Parikh et al. (1995) describe how provision of basic needs can also be represented in this modeling framework.  
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  The distribution of population across the three classes is given by a function 
which represents the proportion of total population having per capita consumption 
expenditure less than  . Typically, in the literature
) , ; (
p
t l LR PC f
p l
8, a two-parameter standard lognormal probability 
density function (SLN) underlies the distribution function f. The two parameters are the Lorenz ratio 
(LR) and the per capita expenditure (PC). We calculate the proportion, popp,t, of people in the p-th 
class using the value of PCt chosen optimally by the model and the class expenditure boundaries (l
p-1 
and l
p) for the p-th class and the value of the Lorenz Ratio (LR), each specified exogenously. The 
magnitude of population in the p-th class is given as 




, ( ; ,l ) (  ;  ,  )  =  − 
−  1    (17) 
 


















    where SLN(z) is area under standard normal curve 










     (18) 
Note that  l
0 = 0 and l
3 = ∞ which yields  f PC LR t (; , ) 00 =  and  f PC LR t (; , ) ∞ =1. 
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     (19) 
  A representative consumer of the p-th class is allowed to choose a linear combination of R 
different types of commodity bundles. Her consumption expenditure budget (PCCp,t) is allocated 
across the R bundles in each time period t so that the following identity holds. 
 




=  ∑ 
1   where  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =      (20) 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Planning Commission (1981 and 1995). 
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Each commodity bundle is composed of different commodities in fixed proportions. For example, 
μi,r,p is the expenditure share of commodity i in the r-th bundle available to a consumer of class p and 
this value remains fixed in the model. Nevertheless, the consumer achieves a degree of substitution 
between different commodities by choosing the combination of different bundles and the amounts she 
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1
μ   where i = 1,2,…,n and t = 1,2,…,T    (21) 
The economy-wide consumption vector {H} is then represented by the sum of consumption vectors 
corresponding to the individual classes. 
 




=  ∑ 
1 
  where i = 1,2,…,n and t = 1,2,…,T        (22) 
Since the distribution parameter (LR) is fixed in our model, poverty alleviation requires growth in 
consumption, which is chosen optimally in the model subject to the constraints.  
  Another point to note in this connection is that we have used the GAMS program to solve the 
model. GAMS, however, does not permit equations with standard lognormal functions, SLN(.) above. 
It, however, permits a loop where the SLN function could be computed before obtaining the 
optimization solution and iterations could be carried out within the loop such that the value of the 
SLN function converges. We have taken advantage of this facility. 
Emissions Inventory  
The emissions from the production sectors are computed by considering the scalar product of the two 
vectors: the activity levels {X} and an emission coefficient vector {e
X}. Apart from the production 
activities, emissions are also caused by the private and public consumption of fuels like kerosene, 
LPG and motor gasoline. We account for these by considering two other emission coefficient vectors, 
{e
C} and {e
G}. The total emissions in period t is therefore given as: 






t =+ +    where  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =    (23) 
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The cumulative stock of CO2 emissions CEMt at the end of any period t is computed by adding the 
emission flows EMt during the current period to the stock CEMt-1 carried over from the previous 
period.  
CEM EMC E M t t t =+ −1   where  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =      (24) 
Carbon Quota 
Finally, we describe the modifications made in model above in order to accommodate the carbon 
quota simulations. Equation (8) is modified to: 
 
) EM EM ( P F  )  GDP  GDP  (  s  S  Z  t t
CQ
t  0  t 
0 
m 
1  j 
t  j  −  +  +  −  +  ≤  ∑ 
= 
 where  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =     (25) 
and Equation (10) is modified to 
 




1  i 
t  ,  i 
n 
1  i 
t i −  +  +  ≤ ∑  ∑ 
=  = 
 where  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =    (26)   
where P
CQ is the price of emission quota (Rs./tC) and EM
___
t is the annual allotment of CO2 emission 
quota. This completes the description of the model equations. 
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Appendix 2 
Derivation of equation (16) in appendix 1 
 
Basically, we modify the original objective function W in Eqn. (1) by extending the 
summation of utilities U beyond the time horizon of T periods to ∞.  Utility derived in time 
period t is expressed as a logarithmic function of per capita consumption PCt in the same time 
period. 
Ut = log(PCt). 
Beyond the terminal period T per capita consumption PC is assumed to grow at the post-
terminal growth rate of φ′ (= φ - n), where n is the post-terminal growth rate of population. 
PCT+τ = PCT(1+φ′)
τ
U T+τ = log(PCT+τ) = log(PCT) + τ log(1+φ′) = UT + τ log(1+φ′) 
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The second term of the above expression for W can be simplified to αUT where using the 
formula for the infinite geometric series (ρ > 0) 
1
1




























Denote the summation part of the third term of the above expression for W by S.  Observe 
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Therefore the third term in the expression for W evaluates to β where 
) ' 1 log(
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It may be observed that α depends only on ρ and T and given their typical values is usually 
greater than 1. 
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Activities Agri Coal Oil Trans Service
Coal Other Oil CCGT Coal Oil
Commodities
Base Year Input-Output Coefficients : [a] 
Agricult. 0.199 0.000 0.003 0.092 0.092 0.002 0.019
Coal 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.184 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.001
Oil 0.010 0.027 0.469 0.157 0.132 0.016 0.040 0.097 0.008
Electricity 0.007 0.096 0.005 0.248 0.248 0.248 0.186 0.031 0.031 0.015 0.007
Industrial 0.075 0.196 0.042 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.342 0.342 0.171 0.063
Transport 0.012 0.044 0.012 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.035 0.024 0.068 0.034
Service 0.038 0.074 0.064 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.119 0.119 0.079 0.058
Make matrix: [u]
A g r i c u l t . 1 000000000
C o a l 0 100000000
O i l 0 010000000
Electricity 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Industrial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
S e r v i c e 0 000000000
Capital composition matrix: [k]
Capital goods
A g r i c u l t . 0 . 1 5 000000000
Industrial 0.8 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958
Transport 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Service 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
Base Year Output (10
12 rupees)
1.810 0.064 0.219 0.140 0.054 0.022 0.000 3.028 0.000 0.418 1.832
Incremental capital output ratio: diagonal elements of [b]
2.046 1.483 1.500 5.348 6.750 6.750 6.270 0.828 0.845 3.286 1.110
Initial capital stock (10
12 rupees)
3.704 0.095 0.329 0.749 0.365 0.149 0.000 2.508 0.000 1.374 2.034
Emision coefficient: [e] in grams/rupee 
CO2 0.55 39.36 13.98 399.52 0.00 221.40 85.00 17.46 12.04 47.92 1.11
1) I-O table [a] is aggregated from a 60x60 absorption matrix obtained from Planning Commission (1991).
2) Capital Coeff. matrix is obtained by taking the composition of investment demand from 1989-90 I-O matrix 
and assuming that the investment goods from agriculture sector are entirely used by agriculture sector itself.
3) Base Year capital stock is the product of ICOR and base year output. 
4)  CO2 emission coefficient are from Parikh, Panda and Murthy (1994). 
Electricity produced from Industry
Table A1
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Commodities Agriculture Coal Oil Electricity Industry Transport Service
Bottom class: {c1} 0.5594 0.0011 0.0075 0.002 0.23 0.03 0.17
Middle class: {c2} 0.4213 0.0009 0.0135 0.0052 0.2803 0.0457 0.2331
Top class:      {c3} 0.2915 0 0.0196 0.01 0.3139 0.075 0.29
Budget shares of different goods in government consumption expenditure
{g} 0.0027 0.0001 0.0195 0.0253 0.1716 0.0257 0.755
Upper bounds on annual growth rate of Imports
g
MU 0.05 0.02 0.05
Upper bounds on annual growth rate of Exports
G
EU 0.05 0.12 0.12
Base year values (10
12 rupees)
Private consumption: C0 1.077 0.002 0.042 0.017 0.781 0.172 0.741
Govt. consumption: G0 0.001 0 0.01 0.013 0.088 0.013 0.386
Export demand: E0 0.029 0 0.005 0 0.204 0.031 0.099
Import demand: M0 0.016 0.006 0.056 0 0.345 0.039 0.027
1) Budget shares in private consumption classes are from Parikh, Panda and Murthy (1994).
Variations in budget shares are permitted around these base values as discussed in the text.
2) Government budget shares are from 1989-90 I-O matrix. 
3)Imports and exports bounds appear only for some sectors indicated above.
4) Base year values are from 1989-90 I-O matrix.
Budget shares of different goods in private consumption expenditure of households
Table A2
Model parameters related to commodities
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  TableA3 
  Other model parameters 
1 Total investment in base year in 10
12 rupees 0.991
2 Maximum domestic incremental savings rate   0.300
3 Annual growth rate of government consumption  0.050
4 Annual foreign borrowings in the dynamics-as-usual scenario (in 
10
12 rupees): Ft 
0.120
5 Annual social discount rate:   0.100
6 Post-terminal annual growth rate  0.055
7 Population in base year in 10
6 821.9
8 Annual growth rate of population (%)  1.8
9 Lorenz ratio of private consumption expenditure distribution: LR  0.38
10 Upper cut-off level of expenditure for bottom class: ( rupees)  2250
11 Upper cut-off level of expenditure for middle class: (rupees)  4000
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